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Abstract
To improve the resilience of distributed training to worst-case, or Byzantine node
failures, several recent approaches have replaced gradient averaging with robust
aggregation methods. Such techniques can have high computational costs, often
quadratic in the number of compute nodes, and only have limited robustness
guarantees. Other methods have instead used redundancy to guarantee robustness,
but can only tolerate limited number of Byzantine failures. In this work, we
present DETOX, a Byzantine-resilient distributed training framework that combines
algorithmic redundancy with robust aggregation. DETOX operates in two steps,
a filtering step that uses limited redundancy to significantly reduce the effect of
Byzantine nodes, and a hierarchical aggregation step that can be used in tandem
with any state-of-the-art robust aggregation method. We show theoretically that
this leads to a substantial increase in robustness, and has a per iteration runtime
that can be nearly linear in the number of compute nodes. We provide extensive
experiments over real distributed setups across a variety of large-scale machine
learning tasks, showing that DETOX leads to orders of magnitude accuracy and
speedup improvements over many state-of-the-art Byzantine-resilient approaches.
1 Introduction
To scale the training of machine learning models, gradient computations can often be distributed
across multiple compute nodes. After computing these local gradients, a parameter server then
averages them, and updates a global model. As the scale of data and available compute power grows,
so does the probability that some compute nodes output unreliable gradients. This can be due to
power outages, faulty hardware, or communication failures, or due to security issues, such as the
presence of an adversary governing the output of a compute node.
Due to the difficulty in quantifying these different types of errors separately, we often model them
as Byzantine failures. Such failures are assumed to be able to result in any output, adversarial or
otherwise. Unfortunately, the presence of a single Byzantine compute node can result in arbitrarily
bad global models when aggregating gradients via their average [1].
In the context of distributed training, there have generally been two distinct approaches to improve
Byzantine robustness. The first replaces the gradient averaging step at the parameter server with a
robust aggregation step, such as the geometric median and variants thereof [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The
second approach instead assigns each node redundant gradients, and uses this redundancy to eliminate
the effect of Byzantine failures [7, 8, 9].
∗Authors contributed equally to this paper and are listed alphabetically.
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Both of the above approaches have their own limitations. For the first, robust aggregators are typically
expensive to compute and scale super-linearly (in many cases quadratically [10, 4]) with the number
of compute nodes. Moreover, such methods often come with limited theoretical guarantees of
Byzantine robustness (e.g., only establishing convergence in the limit, or only guaranteeing that the
output of the aggregator has positive inner product with the true gradient [1, 10]) and often require
strong assumptions, such as bounds on the dimension of the model being trained. On the other hand,
redundancy or coding-theoretic based approaches offer strong guarantees of perfect receovery for the
aggregated gradients. However, such approaches, in the worst-case, require each node to compute
Ω(q) times more gradients, where q is the number of Byzantine machines [7]. This overhead is
prohibitive in settings with a large number of Byzantine machines.
model update
robust aggregation
. . .
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Figure 1: DETOX is a hierarchical scheme for Byzantine gradient aggre-
gation. In its first step, the parameter server partitions the compute nodes
in groups and assigns each node to a group the same batch of data. Af-
ter the nodes compute gradients with respect to this batch, the PS takes
a majority vote of their outputs. This filters out a large fraction of the
Byzantine gradients. In the second step, the parameter server partitions
the filtered gradients in large groups, and applies a given aggregation
method to each group. In the last step, the parameter server applies a
robust aggregation method (e.g., geometric median) to the previous out-
puts. The final output is used to perform a gradient update step.
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Figure 2: Top: convergence com-
parisons among various vanilla ro-
bust aggregation methods and the
versions after deploying DETOX
under “a little is enough" Byzan-
tine attack [11]. Bottom: Per it-
eration runtime analysis of vari-
ous methods. All results are for
ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10.
The prefix “D-" stands for a robust
aggregation method paired with
DETOX.
Our contributions. In this work, we present DETOX, a Byzantine-resilient distributed training
framework that first uses computational redundancy to filter out almost all Byzantine gradients, and
then performs a hierarchical robust aggregation method. DETOX is scalable, flexible, and is designed
to be used on top of any robust aggregation method to obtain improved robustness and efficiency. A
high-level description of the hierarchical nature of DETOX is given in Fig. 1.
DETOX proceeds in three steps. First the parameter server orders the compute nodes in groups of r
to compute the same gradients. While this step requires redundant computation at the node level, it
will eventually allow for much faster computation at the PS level, as well as improved robustness.
After all compute nodes send their gradients to the PS, the PS takes the majority vote of each group
of gradients. We show that by setting r to be logarithmic in the number of compute nodes, after
the majority vote step only a constant number of Byzantine gradients are still present, even if the
number of Byzantine nodes is a constant fraction of the total number of compute nodes. DETOX then
performs hierarchical robust aggregation in two steps: First, it partitions the filtered gradients in a
small number of groups, and aggregates them using simple techniques such as averaging. Second, it
applies any robust aggregator (e.g., geometric median [2, 6], Bulyan [10], Multi-Krum [4], etc.) to
the averaged gradients to further minimize the effect of any remaining traces of the original Byzantine
gradients.
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We prove that DETOX can obtain orders of magnitude improved robustness guarantees compared to
its competitors, and can achieve this at a nearly linear complexity in the number of compute nodes p,
unlike methods like Bulyan [10] that require run-time that is quadratic in p. We extensively test our
method in real distributed setups and large-scale settings, showing that by combining DETOX with
previously proposed Byzantine robust methods, such as Multi-Krum, Bulyan, and coordinate-wise
median, we increase the robustness and reduce the overall runtime of the algorithm. Moreover, we
show that under strong Byzantine attacks, DETOX can lead to almost a 40% increase in accuracy
over vanilla implementations of Byzantine-robust aggregation. A brief performance comparison with
some of the current state-of-the-art aggregators in shown in Fig. 2.
Related work. The topic of Byzantine fault tolerance has been extensively studied since the early
80s by Lamport et al. [12], and deals with worst-case, and/or adversarial failures, e.g., system crashes,
power outages, software bugs, and adversarial agents that exploit security flaws. In the context of
distributed optimization, these failures are manifested through a subset of compute nodes returning to
the master flawed or adversarial updates. It is now well understood that first-order methods, such
as gradient descent or mini-batch SGD, are not robust to Byzantine errors; even a single erroneous
update can introduce arbitrary errors to the optimization variables.
Byzantine-tolerant ML has been extensively studied in recent years [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 2], establishing
that while average-based gradient methods are susceptible to adversarial nodes, median-based update
methods can in some cases achieve better convergence, while being robust to some attacks. Although
theoretical guarantees are provided in many works, the proposed algorithms in many cases only ensure
a weak form of resilience against Byzantine failures, and often fail against strong Byzantine attacks
[10]. A stronger form of Byzantine resilience is desirable for most of distributed machine learning
applications. To the best of our knowledge, DRACO [7] and BULYAN [10] are the only proposed
methods that guarantee strong Byzantine resilience. However, as mentioned above, DRACO requires
heavy redundant computation from the compute nodes, while BULYAN requires heavy computation
overhead on the parameter server end.
We note that [18] presents an alternative approach that does not fit easily under either category, but
requires convexity of the underlying loss function. Finally, [19] examines the robustness of signSGD
with a majority vote aggregation, but study a restricted Byzantine failure setup that only allows for a
blind multiplicative adversary.
2 Problem Setup
Our goal is to solve solve the following empirical risk minimization problem:
min
w
F (w) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi(w)
where w ∈ Rd denotes the parameters of a model, and fi is the loss function on the i-th training
sample. To approximately solve this problem, we often use mini-batch SGD. First, we initialize at
some w0. At iteration t, we sample St uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n}, and then update via
wt+1 = wt − ηt|St|
∑
i∈St
∇fi(wt), (1)
where St is a randomly selected subset of the n data points. To perform mini-batch SGD in a
distributed manner, the global model wt is stored at a parameter server (PS) and updated according to
(1), i.e., by using the mean of gradients that are evaluated at the compute nodes.
Let p denote the total number of compute nodes. At each iteration t, during distributed mini-batch
SGD, the PS broadcasts wt to each compute node. Each compute node is assigned Si,t ⊆ St, and
then evaluates the sum of gradients
gi =
∑
j∈Si,t
∇fj(wt).
The PS then updates the global model via
wt+1 = wt − ηt
p
p∑
i=1
gi.
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We note that in our setup we assume that the parameter server is the owner of the data, and has access
to the entire data set of size n.
Distributed training with Byzantine nodes We assume that a fixed subset Q of size q of the p
compute nodes are Byzantine. Let gˆi be the output of node i. If i is not Byzantine (i /∈ Q), we say it
is “honest”, in which case its output gˆi = gi where gi is the true sum of gradients assigned to node i.
If i is Byzantine (i ∈ Q), its output gˆi can be any d-dimensional vector. The PS receives {gˆi}pi=1,
and can then process these vectors to produce some approximation to the true gradient update in (1).
We make no assumptions on the Byzantine outputs. In particular, we allow adversaries with full
information about F and wt, and that the byzantine compute nodes can collude. Let  = q/p be the
fraction of Byzantine nodes. We will assume  < 1/2 throughout.
3 DETOX: A Redundancy Framework to Filter most Byzantine Gradients
We now describe DETOX, a framework for Byzantine-resilient mini-batch SGD with p nodes, q of
which are Byzantine. Let b ≥ p be the desired batch-size, and let r be an odd integer. We refer to r as
the redundancy ratio. For simplicity, we will assume r divides p and that p divides b. DETOX can be
directly extended to the setting where this does not hold.
DETOX first computes a random partition of [p] in p/r node groups A1, . . . , Ap/r each of size r.
This will be fixed throughout. We then initialize at some w0. For t ≥ 0, we wish to compute some
approximation to the gradient update in (1). To do so, we need a Byzantine-robust estimate of the true
gradient. Fix t, and let us suppress the notation t when possible. As in mini-batch SGD, let S be a
subset of [n] of size b, with each element sampled uniformly at random from [n]. We then partition of
S in groups S1, . . . , Sp/r of size br/p. For each i ∈ Aj , the PS assigns node i the task of computing
gj :=
1
|Sj |
∑
k∈Sj
∇fk(w) = p
rb
∑
k∈Sj
∇fk(w). (2)
If i is an honest node, then its output is gˆi = gj , while if i is Byzantine, it outputs some d-dimensional
gˆi. The gˆi are then sent to the PS. The PS then computes
zj := maj({gˆi|i ∈ Aj}),
where maj denotes the majority vote. If there is no majority, we set zj = 0. We will refer to zj as the
“vote” of group j.
Since some of these votes are still Byzantine, we must do some robust aggregation of the vote.
We employ a hierarchical robust aggregation process HIER-AGGR, which uses two user-specified
aggregation methodsA0 andA1. First, the votes are partitioned in to k groups. Let zˆ1, . . . , zˆk denote
the output of A0 on each group. The PS then computes Gˆ = A1(zˆ1, . . . , zˆk) and updates the model
via w = w − ηGˆ. This hierarchical aggregation resembles a median of means approach on the votes
[20], and has the benefit of improved robustness and efficiency. We discuss this in further detail in
Section 4.
A description of DETOX is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 DETOX: Algorithm to be performed at the parameter server
input Batch size b, redundancy ratio r, compute nodes 1, . . . , p, step sizes {ηt}t≥0.
1: Randomly partition [p] in “node groups” {Aj |1 ≤ j ≤ p/r} of size r.
2: for t = 0 to T do
3: Draw St of size b randomly from [n].
4: Partition St in to groups {St,j |1 ≤ j ≤ p/r} of size rb/p.
5: For each j ∈ [p/r], i ∈ Aj , push wt and St,j to compute node i.
6: Receive the (potentially Byzantine) p gradients gˆt,i from each node.
7: Let zt,j := maj({gˆt,i|i ∈ Aj}), and 0 if no majority exists. %Filtering step
8: Set Gˆt = HIER-AGGR({zt,1, . . . , zt,p/r}). %Hierarchical aggregation
9: Set wt+1 = wt − ηGˆt. %Gradient update
10: end for
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Algorithm 2 HIER-AGGR: Hierarchical aggregation
input Aggregators A0,A1, votes {z1, . . . , zp/r}, vote group size k.
1: Let pˆ := p/r.
2: Randomly partition {z1, . . . , zpˆ} in to “vote groups” {Zj |1 ≤ j ≤ pˆ/k} of size k.
3: For each vote group Zj , calculate zˆj = A0(Zj).
4: Return A1({zˆ1, . . . , zˆpˆ/k}).
3.1 Filtering out Almost Every Byzantine Node
We now show that DETOX filters out the vast majority of Byzantine gradients. Fix the iteration t.
Recall that all honest nodes in a node group Aj send gˆj = gj as in (2) to the PS. If Aj has more
honest nodes than Byzantine nodes then zj = gj and we say zj is honest. If not, then zj may not
equal gj in which case zj is a Byzantine vote. Let Xj be the indicator variable for whether block Aj
has more Byzantine nodes than honest nodes, and let qˆ =
∑
j Xj . This is the number of Byzantine
votes. By filtering, DETOX goes from a Byzantine compute node ratioof  = q/p to a Byzantine vote
ratio of ˆ = qˆ/pˆ where pˆ = p/r.
We first show that E[qˆ] decreases exponentially with r, while pˆ only decreases linearly with r. That
is, by incurring a constant factor loss in compute resources, we gain an exponential improvement in
the reduction of byzantine nodes. Thus, even small r can drastically reduce the Byzantine ratio of
votes. This observation will allow us to instead use robust aggregation methods on the zj , i.e., the
votes, greatly improving our Byzantine robustness. We have the following theorem about E[qˆ]. All
proofs can be found in the appendix. Note that throughout, we did not focus on optimizing constants.
Theorem 1. There is a universal constant c such that if the fraction of Byzantine nodes is  < c, then
the effective number of Byzantine votes after filtering becomes
E[qˆ] = O
(
(r−1)/2q/r
)
.
We now wish to use this to derive high probability bounds on qˆ. While the variables Xi are not
independent, they are negatively correlated. By using a version of Hoeffding’s inequality for weakly
dependent variables, we can show that if the redundancy is logarithmic, i.e., r ≈ log(q), then with
high probability the number of effective byzantine votes drops to a constant, i.e., qˆ = O(1).
Corollary 2. There is a constant c such that if and  ≤ c and r ≥ 3 + 2 log2(q) then for any
δ ∈ (0, 12 ), with probability at least 1− δ, we have that qˆ ≤ 1 + 2 log(1/δ).
In the next section, we exploit this dramatic reduction of Byzantine votes to derive strong robustness
guarantees for DETOX.
4 DETOX Improves the Speed and Robustness of Robust Estimators
Using the results of the previous section, if we set the redundancy ratio to r ≈ log(q), the filtering
stage of DETOX reduces the number of Byzantine votes qˆ to roughly a constant. While we could
apply some robust aggregator A directly to the output votes of the filtering stage, such methods often
scale poorly with the number of votes pˆ. By instead applying HIER-AGGR, we greatly improve
efficiency and robustness. Recall that in HIER-AGGR, we partition the votes into k “vote groups”,
apply some A0 to each group, and apply some A1 to the k outputs of A0. We analyze the case where
k is roughly constant, A0 computes the mean of its inputs, and A1 is a robust aggregator. In this case,
HIER-AGGR is analogous to the Median of Means (MoM) method from robust statistics [20].
Improved speed. Suppose that without redundancy, the time required for the compute nodes to
finish is T . Applying Krum [1], Multi-Krum [4], and Bulyan [10] to their p outputs requires O(p2d)
operations, so their overall runtime is O(T + p2d). In DETOX, the compute nodes require r times
more computation to evaluate redundant gradients. If r ≈ log(q), this can be done in O(ln(q)T ).
With HIER-AGGR as above, DETOX performs three major operations: (1) majority voting, (2) mean
computation of the k vote groups and (3) robust aggregation of the these k means using A1. (1)
and (2) require O(pd) time. For practical A1 aggregators, including Multi-Krum and Bulyan, (3)
requires O(k2d) time. Since k  p, DETOX has runtime O(ln(q)T + pd). If T = O(d) (which
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generally holds for gradient computations), Krum, Multi-Krum, and Bulyan require O(p2d) time, but
DETOX only requires O(pd) time. Thus, DETOX can lead to significant speedups, especially when
the number of workers is large.
Improved robustness. To analyze robustness, we first need some distributional assumptions. At
any given iteration, let G denote the full gradient of F (w). Throughout this section, we assume that
the gradient of each sample is drawn from a distribution D on Rd with mean G and variance σ2.
In DETOX, the “honest” votes zi will also have mean G, but their variance will be σ2p/rb. This is
because each honest compute node gets a sample of size rb/p, so its variance is reduced by a factor
of rb/p.
Suppose Gˆ is some approximation to the true gradient G. We say that Gˆ is a ∆-inexact gradient
oracle for G if ‖Gˆ−G‖ ≤ ∆. [5] shows that access to a ∆-inexact gradient oracle is sufficient to
upper bound the error of a model wˆ produced by performing gradient updates with Gˆ. To bound the
robustness of an aggegator, it suffices to bound ∆. Under the distributional assumptions above, we
will derive bounds on ∆ for the hierarchical aggregator A with different base aggregators A1.
We will analyze DETOX whenA0 computes the mean of the vote groups, andA1 is geometric median,
coordinate-wise median, or α-trimmed mean [6]. We will denote the approximation Gˆ toG computed
by DETOX in these three instances by Gˆ1, Gˆ2 and Gˆ3, respectively. Using the proof techniques in
[20], we get the following.
Theorem 3. Assume r ≥ 3 + 2 log2(q) and  ≤ c where c is the constant from Corollary 2. There
are constants c1, c2, c3 such that for all δ ∈ (0, 1/2), with probability at least 1− 2δ:
1. If k = 128 ln(1/δ), then Gˆ1 is a c1σ
√
ln(1/δ)
b -inexact gradient oracle.
2. If k = 128 ln(d/δ), then Gˆ2 is a c2σ
√
ln(d/δ)
b -inexact gradient oracle.
3. If k = 128 ln(d/δ) and α = 14 , then Gˆ3 is a c3σ
√
ln(d/δ)
b -inexact gradient oracle.
The above theorem has three important implications. First, we can derive robustness guarantees
for DETOX that are virtually independent of the Byzantine ratio . Second, even when there are no
Byzantine machines, it is known that no aggregator can achieve ∆ = o(σ/
√
b) [21], and because we
achieve ∆ = O˜(σ/
√
b), we cannot expect to get an order of better robustness by any other aggregator.
Third, other than a logarithmic dependence on q, there is no dependence on the number of nodes p.
Even as p and q increase, we still maintain roughly the same robustness guarantees.
By comparison, the robustness guarantees of Krum and Geometric Median applied directly to the
compute nodes worsens as as p increases [17, 3]. Similarly, [6] show if we apply coordinate-wise
median to p nodes, each of which are assigned b/p gradients, we get a ∆-inexact gradient oracle
where ∆ = O(σ√p/b+ σ√d/b). If  is constant and p is comparable to b, then this is roughly σ,
whereas DETOX can produce a ∆-inexact gradient oracle for ∆ = O˜(σ/√b). Thus, the robustness of
DETOX can scale much better with the number of nodes than naive robust aggregation of gradients.
5 Experiments
In this section we present an experimental study on pairing DETOX with a set of previously proposed
robust aggregation methods, including MULTI-KRUM [17], BULYAN [10], coordinate-wise median
[5]. We also incorporate DETOX with a recently proposed Byzantine resilience distributed training
method, SIGNSGD with majority vote [19]. We conduct extensive experiments on the scalability and
robustness of these Byzantine resilient methods, and the improvements gained when pairing them
with DETOX. All our experiments are deployed on real distributed clusters under various Byzantine
attack models. Our implementation is publicly available for reproducibility at 2.
The main findings are as follows: 1) Applying DETOX leads to significant speedups, e.g., up to an
order of magnitude end-to-end training speedup is observed; 2) in defending against state-of-the-art
2https://github.com/hwang595/DETOX
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Byzantine attacks, DETOX leads to significant Byzantine-resilience, e.g., applying BULYAN on top of
DETOX improves the test-set prediction accuracy from 11% to 60% when training VGG13-BN on
CIFAR-100 under the “a little is enough" (ALIE) [11] Byzantine attack. Moreover, incorporating
SIGNSGD with DETOX improves the test-set prediction accuracy from 34.92% to 78.75% when
defending against a constatnt Byzantine attck for ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented vanilla versions of the aforementioned Byzantine resilient methods, as well as
versions of these methods pairing with DETOX, in PyTorch [22] with MPI4py [23]. Our experimental
comparisons are deployed on a cluster of 46 m5.2xlarge instances on Amazon EC2, where 1 node
serves as the PS and the remaining p = 45 nodes are compute nodes. In all following experiments,
we set the number of Byzantine nodes to be q = 5.
In each iteration of the vanilla Byzantine resilient methods, each compute node evaluates bp = 32
gradients sampled from its partition of data while in DETOX each compute node evaluates r times
more gradients where r = 3, so rbp = 96. The average of these locally computed gradients is then
sent back to the PS. After receiving all gradient summations from the compute nodes, the PS applies
either vanilla Byzantine resilient methods or their DETOX paired variants.
5.2 Implementation of DETOX
We emphasize that DETOX is not simply a new robust aggregation technique. It is instead a general
Byzantine-resilient distributed training framework, and any robust aggregation method can be im-
mediately implemented on top of it to increase its Byzantine-resilience and scalability. Note that
after the majority voting stage on the PS one has a wide range of choices for A0 and A1. In our
implementations, we had the following setups: 1) A0 = Mean, A1 = Coordinate-size Median, 2)
A0 = MULTI-KRUM, A1 = Mean, 3) A0 = BULYAN, A1 = Mean, and 4) A0 =coordinate-wise
majority vote, A1 =coordinate-wise majority vote (designed specifically for pairing DETOX with
SIGNSGD). We tried A0 = Mean and A1 = MULTI-KRUM/BULYAN but we found that setups 2)
and 3) had better resilience than these choices. More details on the implementation and system-level
optimizations that we performed can be found in the Appendix B.1.
Byzantine attack models We consider two Byzantine attack models for pairing MULTI-KRUM,
BULYAN, and coordinate-wise median with DETOX. First, we consider the “reversed gradient"
attack, where adversarial nodes that were supposed to send g to the PS instead send −cg, for some
c > 0.
The second Byzantine attack model we study is the recently proposed ALIE [11] attack, where the
Byzantine compute nodes collude and use their locally calculated gradients to estimate the mean and
standard deviation of the entire set of gradients among all other compute nodes. The Byzantine nodes
then use the estimated mean and variance to manipulate the gradient they send back to the PS. To
be more specific, Byzantine nodes will send µˆ + z · σˆ where µˆ and σˆ are the estimated mean and
standard deviation by Byzantine nodes and z is a hyper-parameter which was tuned empirically in
[11].
Then, to compare the resilience of the vanilla SIGNSGD and the one paired with DETOX, we will
consider a simple attack, i.e., constant Byzantine attack. In constant Byzantine attack, Byzantine
compute nodes simply send a constant gradient matrix with dimension equal to that of the true
gradient where all elements equals to −1. Under this attack, and specifically for SIGNSGD, the
Byzantine gradients will mislead model updates towards wrong directions and corrupt the final model
trained via SIGNSGD.
Datasets and models We conducted our experiments over ResNet-18 [24] on CIFAR-10 and
VGG13-BN [25] on CIFAR-100. For each dataset, we use data augmentation (random crops, and
flips) and normalize each individual image. Moreover, we tune the learning rate scheduling process
and use the constant momentum at 0.9 in running all experiments. The details of parameter tuning
and dataset normalization are reported in the Appendix B.2.
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5.3 Results
Scalability We report a per-iteration runtime analysis of the aforementioned robust aggregations
and their DETOX paired variants on both CIFAR-10 over ResNet-18 and CIFAR-100 over VGG-13.
The results on ResNet-18 and VGG13-BN are shown in Figure 2 and 3 respectively.
We observe that although DETOX requires slightly more compute time per iteration, due to its
algorithmic redundancy, it largely reduces the PS computation cost during the aggregation stage,
which matches our theoretical analysis. Surprisingly, we observe that by applying DETOX, the
communication costs decrease. This is because the variance of computation time among compute
nodes increases with heavier computational redundancy. Therefore, after applying DETOX, compute
nodes tend not to send their gradients to the PS at the same time, which mitigates a potential network
bandwidth congestion. In a nutshell, applying DETOX can lead to up to 3× per-iteration speedup.
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Figure 3: Left: Convergence performance of various robust aggregation methods over ALIE attack. Right: Per
iteration runtime analysis of various robust aggregation methods. Results of VGG13-BN on CIFAR-100
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Figure 4: End-to-end convergence comparisons among applying DETOX on different baseline methods under
reverse gradient attack. (a)-(c): comparisons between vanilla and DETOX deployed version of MULTI-KRUM,
BULYAN, and coordinate-wise median over ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10. (d)-(f): same comparisons over
VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100.
8
D-M.-K.
over
M.-K.
D-Bulyan
over
Bulyan
D-MoM
over
Med.
Method
86%
88%
90%
92%T
es
t A
cc
ur
ac
y 2.1x 1.94x 5.24x
1.75x 2.51x 5.01x
2.22x 2.48x 5.15x
1.81x 2.1x 4.54x
(a) ResNet-18, CIFAR-10
D-M.-K.
over
M.-K.
D-Bulyan
over
Bulyan
Method
59%
61%
63%
65%
Te
st 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
2.13x 2.04x
2.1x 1.84x
2.43x 1.88x
2.45x 1.94x
D-MoM
over
M.-Med.
Method
45%
48%
50%
55%
11.57x
10.4x
10.4x
11.15x
(b) VGG13-BN, CIFAR-100
Figure 5: Speedups in converging to specific accuracies for vanilla robust aggregation methods and their
DETOX-deployed variants under reverse gradient attack: (a) results of ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10, (b)
results of VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100
Table 1: Summary of defense results over ALIE attacks [11]; the numbers reported correspond to test set
prediction accuracy.
Methods ResNet-18 VGG13-BN
D-MULTI-KRUM 80.3% 42.98%
D-BULYAN 76.8% 46.82%
D-Med. 86.21% 59.51%
MULTI-KRUM 45.24% 17.18%
BULYAN 42.56% 11.06%
Med. 43.7% 8.64%
Byzatine-resilience under various attacks We first study the Byzantine-resilience of all methods
and baselines under the ALIE attack, which is to the best of our knowledge, the strongest Byzantine
attack known. The results on ResNet-18 and VGG13-BN are shown in Figure 2 and 3 respectively.
Applying DETOX leads to significant improvement on Byzantine-resilience compared to vanilla
MULTI-KRUM, BULYAN, and coordinate-wise median on both datasets as shown in Table 1.
We then consider the reverse gradient attack, the results are shown in Figure 4. Since reverse gradient
is a much weaker attack, all vanilla robust aggregation methods and their DETOX paired variants
defend well.
Moreover, applying DETOX leads to significant end-to-end speedups. In particular, combining the
coordinate-wise median with DETOX led to a 5× speedup gain in the amount of time to achieve to
90% test set prediction accuracy for ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10. The speedup results are shown
in Figure 5. For the experiment where VGG13-BN was trained on CIFAR-100, up to an order of
magnitude end-to-end speedup can be observed in coordinate-wise median applied on top of DETOX.
For completeness, we also compare versions of DETOX with DRACO [7]. This is not the focus of this
work, as we are primarily interested in showing that DETOX improves the robustness of traditional
robust aggregators. However the comparisons with DRACO can be found in the Appendix B.4.
Comparison between DETOX and SIGNSGD We compare DETOX paired SIGNSGD with vanilla
SIGNSGD where only the sign information of each gradient element will be sent to the PS. The PS,
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on receiving sign information of gradients, takes coordiante-wise majority votes to get the model
update. As is argued in [19], the gradient distribution for many mordern deep networks can be close
to unimodal and symmetric, hence a random sign flip attack is weak since it will not hurt the gradient
distribution. We thus consider a stronger constant Byzantine attack introduced in Section 5.2. To
pair DETOX with SIGNSGD, after the majority voting stage of DETOX, we set both A0 and A1 as
coordinate-wise majority vote describe in Algorithm 1 in [19]. For hyper-parameter tuning, we
follow the suggestion in [19] and set the initial learning rate at 0.0001. However, in defensing the our
proposed constant Byzantine attack, we observe that constant learning rates lead to model divergence.
Thus, we tune the learning rate schedule and use 0.0001×0.99t (mod 10) for both DETOX and DETOX
paired SIGNSGD.
The results of both ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10 and VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100 are
shown in Figure 6 where we observe that DETOX paired SIGNSGD improves the Byzantine resilience
of SIGNSGD significantly. For ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10, DETOX improves testset prediction
accuracy of vanilla SIGNSGD from 34.92% to 78.75%. While for VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100,
DETOX improves testset prediction accuracy (TOP-1) of vanilla SIGNSGD from 2.12% to 40.37%.
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Figure 6: Convergence comparisons among DETOX paired with SIGNSGD and vanilla SIGNSGD under con-
stant Byzantine attack on: (a) ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10 dataset; (b) VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100
dataset
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Figure 7: Experiment with synthetic data for robust mean estimation: error is reported against dimension (lower
is better)
Mean estimation on synthetic data To verify our theoretical analysis, we finally conduct an
experiment for a simple mean estimation task. The result of our synthetic mean experiment are
shown in Figure 7. In the synthetic mean experiment, we set p = 220000, r = 11, q = b er3 c, and
for dimension d ∈ {20, 30, · · · , 100}, we generate 20 samples iid from N (0, Id). The Byzantine
nodes, instead send a constant vector of the same dimension with `2 norm of 100. The robustness
of an estimator is reflected in the `2 norm of its mean estimate. Our experimental results show that
DETOX increases the robustness of geometric median and coordinate-wise median, and decreases the
dependecne of the error on d.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present DETOX, a new framework for Byzantine-resilient distributed training.
Notably, any robust aggregator can be immediatley used with DETOX to increase its robustness and
efficiency. We demonstrate these improvements theoretically and empirically. In the future, we would
like to devise a privacy-preserving version of DETOX, as currently it requires the PS to be the owner
of the data, and also to partition data among compute nodes. This means that the current version of
DETOX is not privacy preserving. Overcoming this limitation would allow us to develop variants of
DETOX for federated learning.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The following is a more precise statement of the theorem.
Theorem. If r > 3, p ≥ 2r and  < 1/40 then E[qˆ] falls as O (q(40(1− ))(r−1)/2/r) which is
exponential in r.
Proof. By direct computation,
E(qˆ) = E
p/r∑
i=1
Xi

=
p
r
E(Xi)
=
p
r
(r−1)/2∑
i=0
(
q
r − i
)(
p− q
i
)
(
p
r
)
≤ p
r
r + 1
2
(
q
(r + 1)/2
)(
p− q
(r − 1)/2
)
(
p
r
)
≤ p
r
r + 1
2
(
r
(r − 1)/2
)
q(r+1)/2(p− q)(r−1)/2
(p− r)r
=
p
r
r + 1
2
(
r
(r − 1)/2
)
q(r+1)/2(p− q)(r−1)/2
pr(1− r/p)r
≤ p
r
r + 1
2
(
r
(r − 1)/2
)
q(r+1)/2(p− q)(r−1)/2
pr(1/2)r
=
p
r
(r + 1)2r−1
(
r
(r − 1)/2
)
(r+1)/2(1− )(r−1)/2.
Note that
(
r
(r−1)/2
)
is the coefficient of x(r+1)/2(1 − x)(r−1)/2 in the binomial expansion of 1 =
1r = (x+ (1− x))r. Therefore, setting x = 12 , we find that
(
r
(r−1)/2
) ≤ 2r. Therefore,
p
r
(r + 1)2r−1
(
r
(r − 1)/2
)
(r+1)/2(1− )(r−1)/2
≤ p
r
(r + 1)22r−1(r+1)/2(1− )(r−1)/2
=
p
r
(r + 1)
(
22r−1(r−1)/2(1− 
)(r−1)/2
)
=
2q
r
(r + 1)
(
16(1− )
)(r−1)/2
=
2q
r
(
16(r + 1)2/(r−1)(1− )
)(r−1)/2
.
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Note that since r > 3 and r is odd, we have r ≥ 5. Therefore,
E(qˆ) ≤ 2q(40(1− ))(r−1)/2/r.
For r = 3, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If r = 3, then E[qˆ] ≤ q(4δ − 2δ2)/3 when n ≥ 6.
Proof.
E(qe) = E(
p
3∑
i=1
Xi) =
p
3
E(Xi) =
p
3
(
q
3
)
+
(
q
2
)(
p−q
1
)(
n
3
)
=
p
3
q(q − 1)(3p− 2q − 2)
p(p− 1)(p− 2) =
q
3
(
− 1p
)(
3− 2δ − 2p
)
(
1− 1p
)(
1− 2p
)
≤ q
3

3− 2− 2p
1− 2p
≤ q(4− 2)/3
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
From Theorem 1 we see that E[qˆ] ≤ 2q(40(1− ))(r−1)/2/r ≤ 2q(40)(r−1)/2. Now, straightfor-
ward analysis implies that if  ≤ 1/80 and r ≥ 3 + 2 log2 q then E[qˆ] ≤ 1. We will then use the
following Lemma:
Lemma 5. For all θ > 0,
P [qˆ ≥ E[qˆ](1 + θ)] ≤
(
1
1 + θ/2
)E[qˆ]θ/2
Now, using Lemma 5 and assuming θ ≥ 2,
P [qˆ ≥ E[qˆ](1 + θ)] ≤
(
1
1 + θ/2
)E[qˆ]θ/2
=⇒ P [qˆ ≥ 1 + E[qˆ]θ] ≤
(
1
1 + θ/2
)E[qˆ]θ/2
=⇒ P [qˆ ≥ 1 + E[qˆ]θ] ≤ 2−E[qˆ]θ/2
where we used the fact that E[qˆ] ≤ 1 in the first implication and the assumption that θ ≥ 2 in the
second. Setting δ := 2−E[qˆ]θ/2, we get the probability bound. Finally, setting δ ≤ 1/2 makes θ ≥ 2,
which completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
We will prove the following:
P [qˆ ≥ E[qˆ](1 + θ)] ≤
 1
1 +
θ
2

E[qˆ]θ/2
Proof. We will use the following theorem for this proof [26, 27].
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Theorem (Linial [26]). Let X1, . . . , Xpˆ be Bernoulli 0/1 random variables. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be such
that βpˆ is a positive integer and let k be any positive integer such that 0 < k < βpˆ. Then
P
[
pˆ∑
i=1
Xi ≥ βpˆ
]
≤ 1(
βpˆ
k
) ∑
|A|=k
P [∧i∈A(Xi = 1)]
Let βpˆ = E[qˆ](1 + θ). Now, P[Xi = 1] = E[Xi] = E[qˆ]/pˆ. We will show that
P [∧i∈A(Xi = 1)] ≤ (E[qˆ]/pˆ)k
whereA ⊆ {1, . . . , pˆ} of size k. To see this, note that for any i, P[Xi = 1] = E[qˆ]/pˆ. The conditional
probability of some other Xj being 1 given that Xi is 1 would only reduce. Formally, for i 6= j,
P[Xj = 1|Xi = 1] ≤ P[Xi = 1] = γ.
Note that for Xi to be 1, the Byzantine machines in the i-th block must be in the majority. Hence, the
reduction in the pool of leftover Byzantine machines was more than honest machines. Since the total
number of Byzantine machines is less than the number of honest machines, the probability for them
being in a majority in block j reduces. Therefore,
P
[
pˆ∑
i=1
Xi ≥ E[qˆ](1 + θ)
]
≤
(
pˆ
k
)
(
E[qˆ](1 + θ)
k
)P [∧i∈A(Xi = 1)]
≤
(
pˆ
k
)
(
E[qˆ](1 + θ)
k
) (E[qˆ]/pˆ)k
≤ (pˆ)
k
k!
(
E[qˆ](1 + θ)
k
) (E[qˆ]
pˆ
)k
.
Letting k = E[qˆ]θ/2, we then have
P
[
pˆ∑
i=1
Xi ≥ E[qˆ](1 + θ)
]
≤ (pˆ)
k
(E[qˆ](1 + θ/2))k
(E[qˆ]/pˆ)k
=
(
1
1 + θ2
)E[qˆ]θ/2
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We will adapt the techniques of Theorem 3.1 in [20].
Lemma 6 ([20], Lemma 2). Let H be some Hilbert space, and for x1, . . . , xk ∈ H, let xgm be their
geometric median. Fix α ∈ (0, 12 ) and suppose that z ∈ H satisfies ‖xgm − z‖ > Cαr, where
Cα = (1− α)
√
1
1− 2α
and r > 0. Then there exists J ⊆ {1, . . . , k} with |J | > αk such that for all j ∈ J , ‖xj − z‖ > r.
Note that for a general Hilbert or Banach space H, the geometric median is defined as:
xgm := arg min
k∑
j=1
‖x− xj‖H
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where ‖.‖H is the norm on H. This coincides with the notion of geometric median in R2 under the `2
norm. Note that Coordinatewise Median is the Geometric Median in the real space with the `1 norm,
which forms a Banach space.
Firstly, we use Corollary 2 to see that with probability 1− δ, qˆ ≤ 1 + 2 log(1/δ). Now, we assume
that qˆ ≤ 1 + 2 log(1/δ) is true. We will show the remainder of the theorem holds with probability at
least 1− δ, as then a union bound will give us the desired result.
(1): Let us assume that number of clusters is k = 128 log 1/δ for some δ < 1, also note that
128 log 1/δ ≥ 8qˆ. Now, choose α = 1/4. Choose r = 4σ
√
k
b
. Assume that the Geometric Median
is more than Cαr distance away from true mean. Then by the previous Lemma, atleast α = 1/4
fraction of the empirical means of the clusters must lie atleast r distance away from true mean.
Because we assume the number of clusters is more than 8qˆ, atleast 1/8 fraction of empirical means
of uncorrupted clusters must also lie atleast r distance away from true mean.
Recall that the variance of the mean of an “honest” vote group is given by
(σ′)2 = σ2
k
b
.
By applying Chebyshev’s inequality to the ith uncorrupted vote group G[i], we find that its empirical
mean xˆ satisfies
P
(
‖G[i]−G‖ ≥ 4σ
√
k
b
)
≤ 1
16
.
Now, we define a Bernoulli event that is 1 if the empirical mean of an uncorrupted vote group is at
distance larger than r to the true mean, and 0 otherwise. By the computation above, the probability
of this event is less than 1/16. Thus, its mean is less than 1/16 and we want to upper bound the
probability that empirical mean is more than 1/8. Using the number of events as k = 128 log(1/δ),
we find that this holds with probability at least 1 − δ. For this, we used the following version of
Hoeffding’s inequality in this part and part (3) of this proof. For Bernoulli events with mean µ,
empirical mean µˆ, number of events m and deviation θ:
P(µˆ− µ ≥ θ) ≤ exp(−2mθ2)
To finish the proof, just plug in the values of Cα given in the Lemma 2.1 (written above) from [20],
where Cα = 3/2
√
2 for Geometric Median.
(2): For coordinate-wise median, we set k = 128 log d/δ. Then we apply the result proved in previous
part for each dimension of Gˆ. Then, we get that with probability at least 1− δ/d,
|Gˆi −Gi| ≤ C1σi
√
log d/δ
b
where Gˆi is the ith coordinate of Gˆ, Gi is the ith coordinate of G and σ2i is the i
th diagonal entry of
Σ. Doing a union bound, we get that with probability at least 1− δ/d
‖Gˆ−G‖ ≤ C1σ
√
log d/δ
b
.
(3): Define
∆i = σi
√√√√√ k
b
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
where σ2i is the i
th diagonal entry of Σ. Now, for each uncorrupted vote group, using Chebyshev’s
inequality:
P
(
|Gˆi −Gi| ≥ ∆i
)
≤
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
.
Now, ith coordinate of α-trimmed mean lies ∆i away from Gi if atleast αk of the ith coordinates
of vote group empirical means lie ∆i away from Gi. Note that because of the assumption of the
Proposition αk ≥ 2qˆ. Because qˆ of these can be corrupted, atleast αk/2 of true empirical means
16
have ith coordinates that lie ∆i away from Gi. This means α/2 fraction have true empirical means
have ith coordinates that lie ∆i away from Gi. Define a Bernoulli variable X for a vote group as
being 1 if the ith coordinate of empirical mean of that vote group lies more than ∆i away from Gi,
and 0 otherwise.
The mean of X therefore satisfies
E(X) <
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
.
Set
α = 4
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
.
Again, using Hoeffding’s inequality in a manner analogous to part (1) of the proof, we get that
probability of ith coordinate of α-trimmed mean being more than ∆i away from Gi is less than δ/d.
Taking union bound over all d coordinates, we find that the probability of α-trimmed mean being
more than
σ
√√√√√ k
b
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
= σ
√
4k
bα
away from G is less than δ. Hence we have proved that if
α = 4
√
1
2k
log
d
δ
and αk ≥ 2qˆ, then with probability at least 1 − δ, ∆ ≤ σ
√
4k
bα
. Now, set α = 1/4 and k =
128 log(d/δ). One can easily see that αk ≥ 2qˆ is satisfied and we get that with probability at least
1− δ, for some constant C3,
∆ ≤ C3σ
√
log(d/δ)
b
.
B Extra Experimental Details
B.1 Implementation and system-level optimization details
We introduce the details of combining BULYAN, MULTI-KRUM, and coordinate-wise median with
DETOX.
• BULYAN: according to [10] BULYAN requires p ≥ 4q+ 3. In DETOX, after the first majority
voting level, the corresponding requirement in BULYAN becomes pr ≥ 4qˆ + 3 = 11. Thus,
we assign all “winning" gradients in to one cluster i.e., BULYAN is conducted across 15
gradients.
• MULTI-KRUM: according to [1], MULTI-KRUM requires p ≥ 2q + 3. Therefore, for similar
reason, we assign 15 “winning" gradients into two groups with uneven sizes at 7 and 8
respectively.
• coordinate-wise median: for this baseline we follow the theoretical analysis in Section
3.1 i.e., 15 “winning" gradients are evenly assigned to 5 clusters with size at 3 for reverse
gradient Byzantine attack. For ALIE attack, we assign those 15 gradients evenly to 3 clusters
with size of 5. The reason for this choice is simply that we observe the reported strategies
perform better in our experiments. Then mean of the gradients is calculated in each cluster.
Finally, we take coordinate-wise median across means of all clusters.
One important thing to point out is that we conducted system level optimizations on implementing
MULTI-KRUM and BULYAN, e.g., parallelizing the computationally heavy parts in order to make
the comparisons more fair according to [28]. The main idea of our system-level optimization are
two-fold: i) gradients of all layers of a neural network are firstly vectorized and concatenated to a
high dimensional vector. Robust aggregations are then deployed on those high dimensional gradient
vectors from all compute nodes. ii) As computational heavy parts exist for several methods e.g.,
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calculating medians in the second stage of BULYAN. To optimize that part, we chunk the high
dimensional gradient vectors evenly into pieces, and parallelize the median calculations in all the
pieces. Our system-level optimization leads to 2-4 × speedup in the robust aggregation stage.
B.2 Hyper-parameter tuning
Table 2: Tuned stepsize schedules for experiments under reverse gradient Byzantine attack
Experiments CIFAR-10 on ResNet-18 CIFAR-100 on VGG13-BN
D-MULTI-KRUM 0.1 0.1
D-BULYAN 0.1 0.1
D-Med. 0.1× 0.99t (mod 10) 0.1× 0.99t (mod 10)
MULTI-KRUM 0.03125 0.03125
BULYAN 0.1 0.1
Med. 0.1 0.1× 0.995t (mod 10)
Table 3: Tuned stepsize schedules for experiments under ALIE Byzantine attack
Experiments CIFAR-10 on ResNet-18 CIFAR-100 on VGG13-BN
D-MULTI-KRUM 0.1× 0.98t (mod 10) 0.1× 0.965t (mod 10)
D-BULYAN 0.1× 0.99t (mod 10) 0.1× 0.965t (mod 10)
D-Med. 0.1× 0.98t (mod 10) 0.1× 0.98t (mod 10)
MULTI-KRUM 0.0078125× 0.96t (mod 10) 0.00390625× 0.965t (mod 10)
BULYAN 0.001953125× 0.95t (mod 10) 0.00390625× 0.965t (mod 10)
Med. 0.001953125× 0.95t (mod 10) 0.001953125× 0.965t (mod 10)
B.3 Data augmentation and normalization details
In preprocessing the images in CIFAR-10/100 datasets, we follow the standard data augmenta-
tion and normalization process. For data augmentation, random cropping and horizontal ran-
dom flipping are used. Each color channels are normalized with mean and standard deviation
by µr = 0.491372549, µg = 0.482352941, µb = 0.446666667, σr = 0.247058824, σg =
0.243529412, σb = 0.261568627. Each channel pixel is normalized by subtracting the mean value
in this color channel and then divided by the standard deviation of this color channel.
B.4 Comparison between DETOX and DRACO
We provide the experimental results in comparing DETOX with DRACO.
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Figure 8: Convergence with respect to runtime comparisons among DETOX back-ended robust aggregation
methods and DRACO under reverse gradient Byzantine attack on different dataset and model combinations: (a)
ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10 dataset; (b) VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100 dataset
Comp. Comm. Aggr. Iter.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Tim
e 
Pe
r I
te
r (
se
c)
D-Multi-Krum
D-Bulyan
D-MoM
Draco
(a) ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10
Comp. Comm. Aggr. Iter.0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Tim
e 
Pe
r I
te
r (
se
c)
D-Multi-Krum
D-Bulyan
D-MoM
Draco
(b) VGG13-BN on CIFAR-100
Figure 9: Convergence with respect to runtime comparisons among DETOX back-ended robust aggregation
methods and DRACO under reverse gradient Byzantine attack on different dataset and model combinations: (a)
ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10 dataset; (b) VGG13-BN trained on CIFAR-100 dataset
19
